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Property, Privacy and Deterrence:

The Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale
Steven R. Schlesinger*
Bradford Wilson**
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are few rules of criminal procedure that have stirred as much
controversy both on and off the bench as has the so-called "exclusionary rule."' All agree that the function of the rule is to provide a legal
*B.A., Cornell University; M.A., Claremont Graduate School; Ph.D., Claremont Graduate School. This co-author is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of
Politics at The Catholic University of America.
**B.A., North Carolina State University; M.A., Northern Illinois University. This coauthor is a doctoral candidate in political science at The Catholic University of America.
1. Defenses of the rule include: Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties
Policies at the State and FederalLevels: The Case of the Exclusionary Rule, 5 AM. POL.
Q. 55 (1977); Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter
Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?
Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974);
Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 67 (1978); Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United
States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740 (1974).
Criticisms of the rule include: F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, & C. SOWLE, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CRIMINAL LAW ADMINISTRATION 1-84 (1968); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2184a (McNaughton rev. 1961); S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE:

(1977); Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence
Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 565
(1965); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 80 (1961);
Cox, The Decline of the Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative to Injustice, 4 Sw. U.L. REV.
68 (1972); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,53 CALIF. L. REV.
929, 951-54 (1965); LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the ExclusionaryRule
(pts. 1 and 2), 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 566 (1965); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police:
The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L.
REV. 987 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 665 (1970); Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337 (1939);
Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. U.L. REV.
1 (1969); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That it is a Deterrent to Police?,62 JUDICATURE 44 (1979); Satlin, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule,
26 JAG. J. 255 (1972); The Exclusionary Rule Regarding Illegally Seized Evidence: An International Symposium, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 245 (1961); Waite,
Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REV. 169 (1955); Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479 (1922); Wilkey, The Exclusionary
THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
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formula for determining the circumstances under which a violation of
the search and seizure requirements of the fourth amendment renders
evidence inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. Examination of the
leading Supreme Court cases governing the exclusionary rule' reveals,
however, that agreement disintegrates once the question of the specific content of, and rationale for, the rule is broached.
The scope of the rule has both expanded and contracted since its introduction in Boyd v. United States.' The rule of exclusion originally
had a relatively narrow compass, the sphere of private letters and, by
implication, private property. This scope was gradually broadened, a
process that culminated dramatically in the landmark decision in Mapp
v. Ohio,' in which the Court held that goods illegally obtained by law
enforcement officials could not be used as evidence in either state or
federal courts, regardless of property considerations. Yet legal
development, at least American legal development, does not march in a
single direction. Since its accession, the Burger Court has been preRule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978); Wingo, GrowingDisillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971); Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police
Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87 (1968);
Student Comments, The Tort Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 63 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 256 (1972).
2. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that a person subjected to a
search and seizure must show a legitimate expectation of privacy in order to successfully
invoke the protection of the fourth amendment); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268
(1978) (person's statement based on questions prompted by an illegal search does not taint
later testimony by that person at another's trial); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(federal habeas corpus relief is not required when evidence illegally obtained is introduced
by the state in a criminal case and a full and fair opportunity to litigate existed); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (witness before a grand jury may not refuse to
answer questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search or seizure); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (remedy for monetary damages recognized when federal agents conduct an illegal search); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (federal habeas corpus relief denied
to one convicted in a state court on illegally seized evidence); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963) (physical and verbal evidence obtained during an illegal search and
seizure held inadmissible); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule held to be
applicable to states); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (state conviction upheld
although evidence for conviction was illegally obtained); Wolf v. Colarado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949) (exclusionary rule held not to bind state courts); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921) (if defendant did not know of fruits of an illegal search until trial, then a motion
to suppress is correctly considered at that time); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (federal government cannot refuse a timely application for the return of evidence
illegally obtained so that such evidence may be used to convict person searched); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (fourth and fifth amendments preclude obtaining and
using at trial evidence which may lead to sanctions that are effectively criminal).
3. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). (exclusionary rule binds the states also).
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siding over the steady contraction of the exclusionary province initially
established by the Mapp majority.' Such shifts in the scope of a legal
rule are not unusual; often they are a healthy reflection of the ability
of the American legal system to adjust its laws to the requirements of
particular circumstances. This, however, is not the case with the history of the exclusionary rule. An examination shows that the peculiarly elastic life of the rule does not exemplify the flexible application of a
general principle to specific cases; rather, it reflects a shifting consensus of the Court as to what the very foundation and rationale of the
rule is.
The time is ripe for a reconsideration of the foundation of the exclusionary rule. The Burger Court, in attempting both to maintain the
rule and to limit its effect, has found it necessary to resort to dubious
distinctions which appear increasingly arbitrary." Embarrassed by this
state of affairs, the Court, while upholding the rule, has questioned
whether any coherent justification actually exists.7 It seems that a
point-has been reached where the confusion over the proper scope of
the rule cannot possibly be resolved in a sensible manner until a clear
understanding of the fundamental principle and rationale for the rule
is regained.
5. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (admission based on questions prompted by an illegal search does not taint the admissibility of testimony at
another's trial). In support of the majority decision not to suppress the testimony of a
witness because of its connection with an illegal search, Justice Rehnquist argued as
follows:
The greater the willingness of the witness to freely testify, the greater the likelihood that he or she will be discovered by legal means and, concomitantly, the
smaller the incentive to conduct an illegal search to discover the witness. Witnesses are not like guns or documents which remain hidden from view until one
turns over a sofa or opens a-filing cabinet. Witnesses can, and often do, come forward and offer evidence entirely of their own volition.
Id. at 276 (footnote omitted). This reasoning, however, as Justice Marshall explained,
reversed the normal sequence of events. It ignored the obvious fact that a negligible
number of cases arise in which a witness' willingness to testify is known before he is
discovered. Id. at 286-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7. As Justice Powell wrote: "[Allthough the rule is thought to deter unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for fourth amendment values, if applied
indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law
and administration of justice." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976) (footnote omitted).
Justice Powell maintained that the primary rationale for the rule, deterrence of illegal
searches and seizures, was not supported by relevant empirical evidence. Id. at 492. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Doubts about the justification for the rule are not new. See Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 135-56 (1954).
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The major rationales offered by the Supreme Court for the exclusionary rule emerge from an analysis of those cases in which the rationales have received their most cogent formulations. Such an analysis demonstrates the need for a fundamental reexamination by the
Supreme Court of the exclusionary rule as it currently is defined and
applied.
II.

THE ORIGIN OF THE RULE

It is a widely held view that the current exclusionary rule has its
precedential origins in Boyd and Weeks v. United States! Yet the
scope of, and rationale for, the exclusion of evidence in those cases differ significantly from the formulation of the exclusionary rule in postWeeks cases. Boyd v. United States is best known for two principles:
first, that "the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each
other,"' there being an "intimate relation between the two amendments;"1 and second, that the exclusion of certain kinds of evidence
from criminal proceedings follows from the requirements of the fourth
and fifth amendments and enjoys the status of a personal constitutional right." It is submitted that any reading of Boyd that fails to see
its basis in the fourth amendment right to have one's property secure
must necessarily misunderstand the nature of the exclusionary rule
asserted in Boyd.
In his majority opinion in Boyd, Justice Bradley defined an unreasonable search and seizure as follows:
[T]he "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man
to give evidence against himself which in criminal cases is condemned in
the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment,
throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
For Justice Bradley, then, an unreasonable search and seizure was any
process that would compel a man to give evidence against himself. At
first glance, this seems absurd. Surely material taken from an individual's home through a duly executed search warrant is a forcible
seizure of evidence to be used against the individual. Justice Bradley's
8. 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (federal government cannot refuse a timely application for
return of the fruits of an illegal search in order to use such evidence in a criminal proceeding).
9. 116 U.S. at 630.
10. Id. at 633.
11. I at 638.
12. Id at 633.
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theory, as stated, would appear to impugn any search and seizure as
"unreasonable" and declare the fruits of such a search offered in evidence to be a violation of the fifth amendment.
However, Justice Bradley's general statement quoted above was
preceded by a discussion which clarified that statement and makes it
less implausible. According to Justice Bradley, the "principal question"
was whether "a search and seizure, or, what is equivalent thereto, a
compulsory production of a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him ... is such a proceeding for such a purpose an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution." 8 Justice Bradley's silence regarding
the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment clearly indicates
that he did not believe that those requirements defined whether or not
a search and seizure had been "reasonable." Rather, he apparently
believed that the reasonableness of a search and seizure was to be
determined by the legal status of what was seized (in this case, private
papers) and the use to which the seized goods were to be put (here, as
evidence in a forfeiture suit). Thus, Justice Bradley deemed the manner in which a seizure took place to be irrelevant to the question of
reasonableness.
In order to define a rule governing "reasonableness," Justice
Bradley divided the kinds of seized goods into two categories- those
to which an individual has a right and those to which an individual has
no right:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods ...are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and
papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of
using them as evidence against him. The two things differ toto ceolo. In
the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the property,
in the other it is not. 14
Justice Bradley argued that the government was not entitled to
possession of "private books and letters" since one has an inviolable
right to one's private letters as a particularly sacrosanct form of private property. Justice Bradley based this understanding of the sanctity of property upon the principles enunciated in the English case of
Entick v. Carrington.18 In that case, Lord Justice Camden had echoed
John Locke in asserting that "the great end, for which men entered
into society, was to secure their property."" As to private letters,
Lord Camden had stated that "[p]apers are the owner's goods and chat13. Id at 622.
14. Id at 623.
15. 15 Howell's St. Trials 1029 (1765).
16. Id at 1066.
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tels: they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a
seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection."'1 Justice Bradley
read the Entick decision as "expressing the true doctrine on the subject of searches and seizures, and as furnishing the true criteriaof the
reasonable and 'unreasonable' character of such seizures."18 For Justice
Bradley, then, any search and seizure of private papers and books for
the purpose of using them as evidence constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure, regardless of the procedures used.
Justice Bradley moved from this understanding of the search and
seizure clause to the assertion of an exclusionary rule by arguing that
the seizure of an individual's private books and papers, which is unreasonable by definition, is not "substantially different from compelling
him to be a witness against himself."'" Thus the exclusionary rule
enunciated in Boyd was essentially derived from the fifth amendment.
Sufficient attention, however, has not been given to Justice Bradley's
argument that in a seizure of private letters the victim has undergone
an illegal appropriation of his property by the government." This argument implies that the use of such property in evidence would be an
illegal use of goods to which the government has no right. Therefore,
the exclusion of such evidence, and its return to its proper owner,
would appear to be justified regardless of the fifth amendment question.
It is worth noting that Justice Bradley acknowledged the government's right to stolen goods, or more generally, to "things which it is
unlawful for a person to have in his possession,"'" and, by implication,
the propriety of the government's use of such goods as evidence in
court. He thereby exempted such goods from the fifth amendment exclusionary privilege. In Justice Bradley's understanding, if an accused's
own property were to be used to incriminate him, it would be compulsory self-incrimination, but if evidence in which the accused had no
property right were to be used against him, no problems of selfincrimination would exist. Thus, even Justice Bradley's fifth amendment exclusionary rule is justified only in terms of one's personal right
to property. It is only when one perceives that Justice Bradley's
understanding of the reasonableness question posed by the fourth
amendment and the compulsory self-incrimination question posed by
the fifth amendment were both based upon the right to property that
one perceives the most fundamental sense in which the Boyd decision
17. Id.
18. 116 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added).
19. Id at 633.

20.
21.

Id at 622-30.
Id at 624.
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established an "intimate relation" between the fourth and fifth amendments.
In Weeks v. United States,' the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that
the exclusionary rule was applicable to all federal courts. The Weeks
decision is commonly thought to be significant for two reasons: first, it
is said to be the case in which the federal exclusionary rule banning
the use of any illegally obtained evidence in federal courts was first
established on purely fourth amendment grounds; and second, it is said
to have reaffirmed the principle that suppression at the federal level is
a constitutional right of the accused.
The first view can be traced to Justice Frankfurter's statement in
Wolf v. Coloradou that "in Weeks ... this Court held that in a federal
prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence
secured through an illegal search and seizure. This ruling was made
for the first time in 1914."'4 The second view owes its prominence to
Justice Clark's assertion in Mapp v. Ohio' that "the Court in [Weeks]
clearly stated that use of the seized evidence involved 'a denial of the
constitutional rights of the accused.'" 'H Yet, an attentive reading of
Justice Day's opinion for the unanimous Court in Weeks shows that
both Justice Frankfurter and Justice Clark were wrong, and that most
current assumptions about the Weeks case are therefore seriously misguided.
The first point to emphasize is that Weeks, like Boyd, concerned
only private letters. As Justice Day wrote:
The case . . . involves the right of the court in a criminal prosecution to
retain for the purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the
accused, seized in his house in his absence and without his authority, by a
United States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and none for the
search of his premises."
In Weeks, the accused person had made "timely application" to the
court of first instance for an order to return to him the illegally seized
letters. That application was denied and, after a further denial of a second application at the time of trial, the letters were placed in evidence.
The importance of the defendant's applications for the return of his letters and the refusal of the lower court to grant their return cannot be
22. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
23. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (State permitted to use fruit of an illegal search to obtain a conviction). The Wolf decision was expressly overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961).
24. 338 U.S. at 28.
25. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained in searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in a state court).
26. Id. at 648.
27. 232 U.S. at 393.
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overstated. The applications constituted the central factor upon which
the Court's decision rested, and are the key in recognizing that the
foundation of the constitutional ruling in Weeks is the defendant's
right to property.
Justice Day singled out for consideration the alleged error in the
lower court's refusal to grant the petition for the return of the accused's
property and in permitting the papers to be used at trial."8 It was apparent to Justice Day that the question presented involved the adjudication of the motion made by the defendant for the return of certain
letters taken without authority of process. Justice Day emphasized
that this was not a case in which the court, in the midst of a criminal
trial, was asked to exclude evidence because of the manner in which it
had been obtained." He cited with approval a doctrine which holds that
a court, when engaged in the trial of a criminal action, will not take
notice of the manner in which a witness has possessed himself of
papers or other chattels which are material and properly offered into
evidence.? In Justice Day's view, such an inquiry by a court trying a
criminal case would amount to permitting "a collateral issue to be
raised as to the source of competent testimony," a procedure pro28. Id at 389.
29. Id Justice Day here implied and elsewhere explicitly stated that the government
may legitimately seize private letters, if it takes care to act under "authority of process."
See id. at 390-91, 393-94. This view, which was the crux of Justice Miller's dissent in
Boyd, substantially revised Justice Bradley's interpretation of the meaning of the fourth
amendment in a manner accepted by all later courts: it reformulated the question of the
reasonableness of a search and seizure in terms of the legitimacy of the procedures by
which a search and seizure is made, and not in terms of the legal status of the material
seized. Thus, contrary to Boyd, no object, including the "dearest property" of an individual-his private papers-is immune to legal process. In Justice Day's view, the warrant procedure is a legal method by which the government may dispossess an owner of
his property and thereby acquire a right to use the appropriated property in trial proceedings. We note that this understanding renders the fifth amendment exclusionary
right asserted in Boyd inapplicable in such circumstances. For, if private property is
seized through proper police procedures, it may no longer be viewed as an extension of
oneself. Having been forfeited to the government for its use, such property cannot be considered self-incriminating when used in court.
30. Id at 396. The Court quoted from the decision of the New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 358, 68 N.E. 636, 638 (1903), aff'd, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), in
which that court affirmed the conviction of the defendant for possession of gambling
papers and paraphernalia, in part on the basis of papers and evidence which defendant
alleged were unlawfully seized. Id. at 363, 68 N.E. at 640. In so ruling, the New York
court ruled that in a trial of a criminal case, the trial court will not take notice of the manner in which evidence has been obtained. The United States Supreme Court, on appeal,
upheld that ruling, stating that "the weight of authority as well as reason limits the inquiry to the competency of the proferred testimony, and the courts do not stop to inquire
as to the means by which the evidence was obtained." Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585,
592 (1904).
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hibited by "so many state cases that it would be impracticable to cite
or refer to them in detail.""1 What distinguishes the Weeks case from
the above type of case is the source of Weeks' claim. It was grounded
not upon an argument that it is a court's duty to look into the source
of evidence presented at trial, but rather upon the fact that he "applied to [the court] in due season for the return of papers seized in
violation of the Constitutional Amendment."8
Thus, the principle enunciated by Justice Day in Weeks was not, as
asserted by Justice Frankfurter, that "in a federal prosecution the
Fourth Amendment bar[s] the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure,"" but rather was that "papers wrongfully
seized should be turned over to the accused."" Applying this principle,
the Court concluded
that having made a seasonable application for their return, which was
heard and passed upon by the court, there was involved in the order
refusing the application a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored these letters to the accused. In holding them and permitting their use upon the trial, we think
prejudicial error was committed.u
It is important to recognize that, contrary to Justice Clark's understanding, the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused in
Weeks occurred when application for the return of the seized property
was denied. In other words, the accused's constitutional right was to
have his property, which had been illegally seized, returned. What was
violated was not a right not to be convicted by illegally obtained evidence but, rather, a simple property right. By holding Weeks' letters
and using them in trial, the government made use of appropriated
material to which it had not established a right, resulting in prejudicial
error. That is, Weeks' entire case rested on the fact that he had made
timely application for the return of his property. Justice Day, in holding that Weeks' application had been wrongfully refused, drew the conclusion that any use by the government of that property, including its
use in trial, was necessarily unlawful."
31. 232 U.S. at 396.
32. l See also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (holding that a judge
may entertain a motion at trial for suppression of property offered in evidence if the
defendant did not know of the government's possession of the property until it was
offered in evidence against him).
33. 338 U.S. at 28.
34. 232 U.S. at 398.
35. Id (emphasis added).
36. This reasoning makes unnecessary any consideration of the relevance of the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment to this case.
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Thus, the only "exclusionary rule" found in Weeks is that a higher
court may reverse a conviction that was based upon illegally obtained
property when the accused individual can point to a "seasonable application" to have his property returned and can further demonstrate
that his application had been wrongly denied. A logical implication of
this doctrine is that the government could legitimately introduce in
evidence any material that is not the property of the individual, even if
that material had been acquired through a violation of the search and
seizure provision of the fourth amendment. One's property rights surely
cannot extend to goods such as contraband.
III.

FROM PROPERTY TO PRIVACY: A QUESTIONABLE TRANSITION

To understand how the Court has strayed from the original property-grounded rule of exclusion, one must turn to Justice Frankfurter's
majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado." The Wolf case was concerned
specifically with the fourteenth amendment and not the fourth amendment. Frankfurter chose to treat the problem of arbitrary search and
seizure, as it applied to the states, in terms of the "right of privacy."
On this basis, he maintained that
were a State affirmatively to sanction [arbitrary] police incursion into
privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different order. How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what
remedies against it should be afforded, the means by which the right
should be made effective, are all questions that are not to be so dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring
from an allowable range of judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution.u
Justice Frankfurter distinguished the remedy for arbitrary search and
seizure required of states by the fourteenth amendment from the
remedy required of federal authorities by the fourth amendment. In
particular, while leaving room for a variety of solutions at the state
level, he concluded that the fourth amendment required at the federal
level the exclusion of certain evidence as a matter of "judicial implication." In particular, he "stoutly adhere[d]" to the rule of exclusion laid
down in Weeks, although, as previously mentioned, his reading of the
Weeks holding was an inaccurate one.39
Justice Frankfurter's overly broad formulation of the Weeks rule
followed from his failure to recognize, or at least to articulate, the fact
that the "judicial implication" performed in Weeks was one drawn
37. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
38. Id at28.
39. Id See notes 22-37 and accompanying text supra.
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from the property right secured in the fourth amendment. The "dogmatic" answer given in Weeks to the question of the proper remedy
for an arbitrary search and seizure was limited to the case of an illegal
appropriation of private property. In that instance, the property must
be returned to its lawful owner upon his timely application. By failing
to differentiate clearly between the property right basis of fourth
amendment evidentiary adjudication, as manifested in Boyd and
Weeks, and the right to privacy basis of fourteenth amendment evidentiary adjudication outlined in Wolf, Justice Frankfurter opened the
door to later decisions which relied upon his analysis of the fourteenth
amendment in interpreting the meaning of the fourth amendment. By
looking at the fourth amendment only in terms of privacy, the Court in
later cases was compelled to view the exclusionary rule in like terms.
The question became whether the rule did or did not effect reparations
of the violation of the right to p1ivacy. In this new posture, the Court
tended to lose sight of the original justification for, and limited nature
of, the "exclusionary rule"-a right to have one's property returned
when illegally seized-and instead turned to questions of deterrence.
IV.

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AS GROUNDED
IN THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

In Mapp v. Ohio,'" the Court imposed the exclusionary rule on state
courts by way of the fourteenth amendment. There is language in
Justice Clark's majority opinion which has convinced some readers
that the decision was based upon the rule's deterrent effect, but the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule was clearly only a factual consideration as opposed to a logical deduction from constitutional language.'1 It is true that Justice Clark discussed deterrence and concluded
that "other remedies [against invasions of the 'right of privacy'] have
been worthless and futile."'" He thereby pointed to his own belief that
the exclusionary rule was a superior form of deterrence; at least, he
believed that it was not any worse than the other means of protection
referred to in Wolf. Yet it is clear that he was only trying to counter
Wolf's claim that the exclusionary rule was bad law from a policy
standpoint. The only reason Justice Clark engaged in that factual discussion was that he read Wolf to be "bottomed on factual considerations,"' as opposed to constitutional analysis or deduction, and out of
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1967).
41. Id. at 651. Justice Clark stated that factual considerations "are not an essential
ingredient of the fourth amendment as the right it embodies is vouchsafed against the
states by the Due Process Clause." Id
42. Id at 652.
43. Id at 651.
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respect for the precedent he was overturning, he felt obliged to meet
and defeat it on its own grounds first, before moving to the basis of his
own position.
According to Justice Clark, the imposition of the rule was justified
primarily by the following:
[I]n extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part of
the right to privacy-be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of
the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In short, the admission of
the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial
of its most important constitutionalprivilege, namely, the exclusion of the
evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure."
The question this language raises is: what is it about the exclusionary
rule that makes it a constitutional requirement? Although Justice
Clark initially asserted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was
to deter, this surely cannot be the foundation of the constitutional
right he asserted, for he repeatedly stated that factual considerations
were not determinative of the constitutional question. Justice Clark,
perhaps in an attempt to bring forth all the arguments he could marshall, momentarily lapsed by bringing back into the constitutional discussion this factual consideration, which is a policy, not a constitutional,
matter.
Although this digression temporarily derailed his train of thought,
Justice Clark immediately returned to a pure constitutional analysis,
grounding the exclusionary rule upon the following constitutional
right:
We find that, as to the Federal Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of
privacy and the freedom from convictions based upon coerced confessions
do enjoy an "intimate relation" in their perpetuation of "principles of
humanity and civil liberty .... " The philosophy of each Amendment and
of each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent upon, that
of the other in its sphere of influence-the very least that together they
assure in either sphere is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.a
Thus, according to Justice Clark, it is "principles of humanity and civil
liberty," implicit in the concept of ordered liberty which require the
exclusion of evidence. The specific principle asserted is that "no man is
to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence." It is this concern for the

44.
45.

Id at 655-56 (emphasis added).
Id at 656-57 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
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dignity and priority of the individual and his privacy, together with
the concern with maintaining the integrity of a civil order dedicated to
"principles of humanity and civil liberty," not the problem of deterrence, which provided the fundamental constitutional foundation for
Justice Clark's opinion in Mapp.
V.

FROM PRIVACY TO DETERRENCE

Only four years after Mapp, the majority of the Court had reconsidered its reasoning and was marching to a different drummer. In
Linkletter v. Walker,"' the Court announced that deterrence of police
misbehavior, not enforcement of the constitutional right to privacy,
was the primary justification for the exclusionary rule. Curiously, it
was Justice Clark who, writing for the majority, asserted that "all of
the cases since Wolf requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have
been based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police
action."' 7 In light of his own opinion in Mapp, this statement is patently false. But it served its purpose. It effectively put an end to the
short-lived attempt to ground the exclusionary rule in a "logically and
constitutionally necessary" deduction from a fourth amendment "right
to privacy." As the Linkletter majority recognized, "the ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored" by means of
the exclusionary rule. "Reparation comes too late."' 8
And so it has gone since Linkletter. In United States v. Calandra,"
the Court, citing Linkletter, repeated that the primary purpose of the
rule is to effectuate the guarantees of the fourth amendment by deterring unlawful police conduct, rather than to "redress the injury to the
1
privacy of the search victim.""5 In Stone v. Powell,"
the Court continued the new "deterrence" tradition and, through Justice Powell,
spelled out its constitutional implications by stating that "[p]ost-Mapp
decisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right."52 Thus, as with any judicially-created remedy for a social ill, the
usefulness of the rule in a particular context must be subjected to
pragmatic analysis. "The answer is to be found by weighing the utility
46. 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (federal habeas corpus relief denied to one convicted in state
court, partially on the fruits of illegally obtained evidence; Court refused to apply Mapp
retrospectively).
47. Id. at 636.
48. Id. at 637.
49. 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (witness before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions based on illegally seized evidence).
50. Id at 347.
51. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus not constitutionally required when
state proceeding provided fair opportunity to litigate).
52. Id. at 486.
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of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it . . . ." Under
current doctrine, the utility of the rule can be measured only in terms
of its deterrent effect on police misconduct. Considering the fact that
the Court's reading of the scholarly research on deterrence has led it
to conclude that there is an "absence of supportive empirical evidence" for the proposition that exclusion deters future violations of
the fourth amendment by police officers, it is not surprising that
nearly all major exclusionary rule cases since Mapp have either refused to extend or have in effect contracted the scope of the rule." The
hey-day of the deterrence rationale, and with it, that of the doctrine of
exclusion, appears to have passed.
VI.

THE NEED FOR A RETURN TO A PROPERTY-BASED
RATIONALE FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The history of the exclusionary rule has been traced from its foundation in the personal right to property protected by the fourth amendment, to its later foundation in the right to privacy secured by the
fourth and fourteenth amendments, and finally to its current foundation in the non-constitutional policy doctrine of deterrence. Prior to
Justice Frankfurter's erroneous dictum in Wolf regarding the federal
doctrine of exclusion laid down in Weeks, the question of the validity
of hard evidence offered in court was easily and precisely determined
through traditional property concepts. After Wolf, however, things
were never again as simple. In Mapp, Justice Clark attempted to place
Justice Frankfurter's over-extended characterization of the federal exclusionary rule upon solid ground, as well as to apply it to the states,
by neglecting property considerations and by deriving the rule from
the constitutional right to privacy. While accepting Justice Clark's
preference for recasting the fourth amendment in terms of privacy
rather than property, the Burger Court, in Linkletter and Calandra,rejected Mapp's logic of deducing an across-the-board exclusionary rule
from the fourth amendment right to privacy, and therefore was able to
view the question of exclusion as turning entirely on the question of
deterrence. As things now stand, the Supreme Court, skeptical of any
deterrent benefits offered by the rule, continues to pay lip service to
the deterrence rationale while at the same time narrowing the rule's
field of operation.
53. Id. at 489.
54. Id at 492.
55. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). But see Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
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Thus, the movement away from a property-based understanding of
the question of exclusion, apparently inspired by the desire to broaden
the scope of the exclusionary rule beyond the limits of private property, has led to the very real possibility of the Court's abandoning the
rule altogether." Nonetheless, the most recent pronouncement of the
Supreme Court regarding the exclusionary rule indicates that the
Court may again be moving toward a property-based approach. In
Rakas v. Illinois,57 the defendants had been convicted of armed robbery
based in part upon the state's introduction into evidence of a sawed-off
rifle and rifle shells which had been seized by police during a search of
the automobile in which the defendants had been passengers. The rifle
was found under the front passenger seat and the shells were found in
the glove compartment. The automobile was not owned by the defendants and the defendants did not claim ownership of the rifle or shells.
The Rakas Court upheld the defendant's conviction by finding that the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence,
derived from the search of the automobile, was proper."
The Court in Rakas, with Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, held that a person subjected to a search and seizure must show a
"legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place" in order to
claim the protection of the fourth amendment. 9 The majority stressed
that "by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned
use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the
privacy interests protected by the Amendment."' OThe Court then proceeded to affirm the denial of defendant's motion to suppress the
seized evidence which was based upon a fourth amendment claim
because "[tihey asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest
in the [place searched], nor an interest in the property seized... 1
This case, in its recognition of the large role which property plays in
protecting personal privacy, succeeded in establishing the relevance of
property considerations for determining whether a search and seizure
brings into play fourth amendment rights. The Supreme Court's willingness to undertake a reconsideration of the use of property concepts
in facilitating fourth amendment adjudication is a welcome development. However, the Court failed to entertain the possibility that prop56. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
58. Id. at 129-30, 148.
59. Id. at 143.
60. Id. at 143-44 n.12.
61. Id. at 148.
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erty considerations, although relevant to the question of the legality of
a search and seizure (as an indicator of the presence of privacy interests), are determinative of the question of exclusion. More specifically,
the Rakas Court failed to consider the possibility that a search and
seizure may be an unlawful violation of the "privacy interests" protected by the fourth amendment, while the fruits of the search and
seizure may nonetheless be admissible in court as evidence, i e., in
cases where the defendant has no "property interest" in the items
seized. As the Court was aware, remedies do exist for the victim of an
illegal search and seizure in addition to suppression of evidence. One
may be able to recover damages for the violation of his fourth amendment rights or seek redress under state invasion of privacy or trespass
laws. 2
In conclusion, unless or until the Court chooses abandonment over
reform of the exclusionary rule, it must continue to search for rational
distinctions governing the disposition of the rule in concrete cases.
Whatever else one might think of the property-based approach taken
by the early architects of exclusionary doctrine, it must be admitted
that it rested upon distinctions that were clear and rational. It is not
clear whether the same can be said for the path taken by the Court
since then. In light of the erratic and confused history of the exclusionary doctrine since the time of Weeks, perhaps we should remain open
to the lesson of simpler times-times when the exclusion of evidence
was seen, not as a remedy for violations of "legitimate expectations of
privacy," nor as a deterrent for unlawful police conduct, but rather as
an obvious consequence of the government's illegal appropriation of
privately owned goods.
62.

Id at 134 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 365, 367 (1961)).

